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DURING the first years of its existence, the New Deal fought a stren-
uous battle against the holding company and similar forms of complex
corporate organization.1 To attain its ends the Administration em-
ployed varied legal weapons, including the taxing power. Thus, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, in his 1935 message to Congress, urged by means of
"taxation the simplification of our corporate structures through the
elimination of unnecessary holding companies in all lines of business." 2
One of the logical directions of development from this premise was
the encouragement of voluntary corporate simplification wherever
possible. Since under prevailing tax law at the time all corporate
liquidations were taxable upon distribution to the full extent of gain
realized, there had been little incentive to merge subsidiaries with
parent corporations.3 It was apparently to create such an incentive
that Senator Harrison, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, introduced an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1935 which
provided substantially that parent corporations would postpone gain
or loss resulting from liquidation of 80% controlled subsidiaries until
later disposal of the assets by the parent.4 The House had no similar
provision in its bill,5 despite the fact that intercorporate dividends were
fully taxable and failure to make such distributions would subject
corporations to a maximum tax of 42y2% on the amount of retained
earnings.'
t LL.B. Yale Law School, February, 1949.
1. For an excellent general discussion of the entire holding company problem,
pointing up the New Deal reforms which were to follow, see BONBRIGHT & MEANS, Tn
HOLDING COMPANY, ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932).
2. President Roosevelt's message to Congress on Tax Revision, June 19, 1935. 4
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 276 (1935).
3. Prior to 1935 the statutes required that all distributions in liquidation be con-
sidered as in full payment for the stock cancelled, and the gain or loss resulting was
determined according to the rules applicable to the sale or exchange of stock. E.g.,
Revenue Act of 1934, §§ 112, 115 (c), 48 STAT. 704, 711 (1934).
The rule had been that gain or loss was recognizable, even where all the stock in
the subsidiary was owned by one parent corporation. Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Manu-
facturing Co., 287 U.S. 544 (1932) ; The France Co., 29 B.T.A. 661 (1934).
Under the Act of 1921 the profit upon liquidation had been treated as an ordinary
taxable dividend to the extent of any undistributed profits accumulated since March 1,
1913. Revenue Act of 1921, § 201 (a), 42 STAT. 228 (1923) ; Eric A. Pearson, 16 B.T.A,
1405 (1929); Frank Darrow, 8 B.T.A. 276 (1927).
4. 79 CONG. REC. 13239-40 (1935).
5. Ibid.
6. See Klein, Liquidations Under the Revenue Act of 1936, 14 TAx MAG. 648 (1936).
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During committee hearings there was considerable interest in this
amendment-Section 112 (b)(6)-and several corporate officials ap-
peared in its defense. Two principal arguments were advanced by
these proponents. First, it was said that many business enterprises had
expanded in order to obtain balanced production and assure supplies
of raw materials. In industries where constant development and
change is essential-such as in the chemical field-new developments
could not be risked unless some means of insulation could be achieved
through the formation of subsidiary development corporations. As-
suming this motive to be "legitimate," the witness went on to urge
that such businesses be granted an opportunity to dissolve voluntarily
without adverse tax consequences. 7 Secondly, the position was urged
that, in actuality, the parent and subsidiary represent but one unitary
business venture, owned by one group of shareholders, even though
in form the two corporations are separate entities. The advocate of
this view reasoned that, since mergers of separate corporations were
non-taxable, unification of such closely connected businesses should
be exempt afortiori.8
Whichever may have been the influential argument in the Senate-
House Conference Committee hearings, the provision emerged success-
fully and became law.9
The nine years which have elapsed since the passage of Section 112
(b) (6) form an interesting and informative backdrop for study of the
statute and the various problems relative to its administration. Dur-
ing that period numerous uncertainties in interpretation have mani-
fested themselves-so many that this paper undertakes to deal with
but a few of the more important problems arising under the section.
Discussed at length are the following: (1) the indicia of a "plan of
liquidation" within the intent of the statute; (2) the problem of whether
property of a liquidating corporation should be held to include money;
(3) the factors which distinguish debt payments by subsidiaries from a
return of capital to the parent; and (4) the ramifications of employing
Section 112 (b) (6) as a device for the tax-free sale of assets.
Other problems, such as the treatment of dividend credits, install-
ment obligations and minority shareholders,' have been left for future
7. Statement of William AV. Schneider, 'Monsanto Chemical Company, Hearings
before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 8974, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 301-3 (1935).
Mr. Schneider emphasized the fact that corporate structures had been built in reliance
upon laws which existed prior to the time when inter-corporate dividends became tax-
able. It was his contention that, had corporations anticipated such legislative changes,
stock prices would have been more adequately discounted in advance.
8. Statement of Julian D. Conover, American Mining Congress. Id. at 170-1.
9. See Statenicnt of Managers on the Part of the House, H. R. R-P. No. 185,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1935).
10. The minority shareholders cannot benefit directly from the relief provisions of
§ 112 (b) (6), and they must take as their basis the fair market A-alue of property re-
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treatment, along with a study of earnings-and-profits difficulties which
may arise from the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in the
Phipps case."
WHAT CONSTITUTES A "PLAN OF LIQUIDATION"
The initial question which must be faced in a consideration of Sec-
tion 112 (b) (6) is one of statutory construction, which arises in defining
the term "plan of liquidation" as it is employed in the section. The
inquiry is extremely germane because the applicability of the section
has been made totally dependent on a finding that a plan exists. 12
Before proceeding further it may be well to add a word of caution in
this regard: it is entirely possible from a reading of the statutory provi-
sion to assume that it establishes two differing standards for determin-
ing whether or not a plan exists, depending upon whether the dis-
tribution to the parent is to be completed within one year, or within
the full allowable three-year period. In the former situation, Sec-
tion 112 (b)(6)(C) of the Code is explicit. It requires "the adoption
by the shareholders of the resolution under which is authorized the
distribution of all the assets .. . in complete cancellation or redemp-
tion of all its stock .. . even though no time for the completion of the
transfer of the property is specified. . . ." 1" Thus the plan require-
ments seem at a minimum where there is to be an immediate and not a
prolonged liquidation.
The Code appears more demanding of three-year liquidations. Here
the conspicuous leniency of Section 112 (b) (6) (C) is lacking, and the
only description of the plan is that it must contemplate completion
of the liquidation distribution within three years from the date of the
plan's inception.' 4 As we shall observe, however, court decisions have
thus far interpreted the three-year liquidation plan in nearly the same
way as the admittedly informal one-year plan."
ceived in liquidation, even though the parent received a tax-free distribution. A. R. R. 403,
4 Cum. BuL L. 32 (1921) ; Gloyd v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. de-
nied, 290 U. S. 633 (1933). However, if the liquidation takes place as part of a reorganiza-
tion under § 112 (b) (3), and the minority interests accept stock in the parent for their
shares in the subsidiary, the exchange in their hands would be free of tax. Cf. Survaunt v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947). Such a procedure is authorized by the
last sentence of § 112 (b) (6). Nevertheless, there is always the likelihood that the Com-
missioner will regard this transaction as a sham, and attack the reorganization. See
Winston Brothers Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 905 (1934), aff'd, 76 F.2d 381 (8th
Cir. 1935), however, for a holding in favor of the minority stockholder's position.
11. Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410 (1949) (deficit of subsidiary does not
reduce parent's earnings and profits in determining whether subsequent distributions
represent dividends or return of capital).
12. INT. REv. CoDE§ 112 (b) (6) (A), (D).
13. Id. at (C). [Emphasis added].
14. Id. at (D).
15. Compare Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F,2d 214 (6th Cir 1948),
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The Regulations appear to follow the Code's double standard,
although they make no attempt to define precisely what constitutes a
plan under the short one-year liquidation.'0 But Reg. 111, Sec. 29.112
(b) (6)-5 (a) does prescribe that the plan's adoption must be shown by the
acts of the subsidiary's officers, and a record of its adoption must appear
on the corporate records.17 In addition, the plan must be certified in
writing, along with a statement in detail as to all transactions pertaining
to the plan.18 This would indicate the Treasury's intention to scrutinize
carefully all plans submitted and should result in careful formal com-
pliance with the few specific requirements that exist. But corporate
officials are likely to find it difficult to know just where the Treasury
will draw the line of Section 112 (b)(6) applicability, because in many
respects the law on the subject of plan requirements is still in the process
of judicial formulation.
Few cases have as yet arisen under the Code provision, but in one
pre-1935 decision, Kennemer v. Commissioner,1 the court gives good
indication of what it considers minimum plan requirements, at least in
the ordinary one-year liquidation:
"It is not material . . . that no formal resolution to liquidate
or dissolve the corporation had been adopted when the distribution
was made. An intention to liquidate was fairly implied from the
sale of all the assets and the act of distributing the cash to the
stockholders. . . . The determining element was the intention to
liquidate the business, coupled with the actual distribution of the
cash to the stockholders." 2.
Aside from this holding, most of the more recent litigation concern-
ing the plan of liquidation has arisen in situations where the taxpayer-
parent has attempted a taxable liquidation in order to recognize a tax
loss. The Commissioner has been quick to assert tax deficiencies in
these instances and to disallow the loss.2 ' Thus he has taken advantage
and Service Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F2d 75 (Sth Cir. 1948), -uith Oregon Land and
Livestock Co., P-H 1943 TC ME!I. DEc. Smv. 143,503 (1943).
16. U. S. TREAs. RaG. 111, §29.112 (b) (6) (1943).
17. Id. at §29.112 (b) (6)-5(a).
18. Id. at §29.112 (b) (6)-5 (b) (1).
19. 96 F2d 177 (5th Cir. 1938). Accord: Holmby Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 F2d
548 (9th Cir. 1936); Tootle v. Commissioner, 58 F.2d 576 (Sth Cir. 1932); Horn &
Hardart Baking Co. v. U. S., 34 F.Supp. 89 (E.D.Pa.1940). Contra: Schuman Carriage
Co., 43 B.T.A. 8S0 (1941). These cases likevise dealt with plan requirements prior to
the 1935 amendment, but appear equally analogous to the problem under consideration.
20. 96 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 1938).
21. Burnside v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1948); Service Co. v. Com-
missioner, 165 F.2d 75 (Sth Cir. 1948); Beretta v. Commissioner, 141 F2d 454 (Sth
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944) ; International Investment Corp, 11 T. C.
678 (1948), appealed by taxpayer, Feb. 8, 1949, P-H CrrATo. Fa.. TAx Sanv. 7039
(Supp. far. 22, 1949).
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of the literal wording of a statute which had probably been passed as a
relief provision for corporate taxpayers,22 and has applied the section
to prevent any offset-losses from becoming available to the taxpayer-
parent.
Perhaps the leading case on the interpretation of this portion of
Section 112 (b)(6) is Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner,23 decided in
1948. Corporation S, wholly owned by Corporation P, sold all of its
assets in one taxable year, liquidated, and distributed the cash re-
ceived to P over a period greater than the taxable year. Since P's
stock basis was in excess of the total distribution to it, it naturally
desired a taxable liquidation in order to offset its loss from the liquida-
tion against total gains from other sources.24 Unfortunately for P,
however, the Tax Court 25 and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit both found that S's actions, although certainly not so intended by
S or P, amply fulfilled statutory requirements for a three-year plan of
liquidation under Section 112 (b)(6), and thus postponed any recogni-
tion of loss by P.
The Court of Appeals reasoned in this case that even in an extended
three-year liquidation proceeding there need be no statement in the
plan of the expected date of completion, since the corporation might
be presumed to intend compliance with the statutory requirements. 0
In this connection it will be recalled that the Regulations require a
statement of the expected completion date.27 The court, however,
chose to treat the provision in the Regulation as merely requiring an
informal plan. In a neat bit of judicial legerdemain the court said:
". .. [T]he proposal was the liquidation, and the method proposed of
effecting the liquidation was the plan." 25
Shortly before the Sixth Circuit opinion in the Burnside case, the
Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Service Co. v. Commissioner.23
However, the Tax Court's reasoning in the latter decision was based
largely upon the prior Tax Court holding in the Burnside case. 30 The
Eighth Circuit relied upon the theory that where a liquidation in fact
meets all the requirements of Section 112 (b)(6), it must be so treated
22. Text at notes 7 and 8 supra.
23. 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1948).
24. Under the ordinary liquidation provisions, § 111 and § 115(c) of the Code, gain
or loss on such distributions was immediately recognizable. Loss would be the excess
of the basis of the stock held in the subsidiary over the fair market value of the property
received on liquidation. INT. Ray. CODE §§ 111, 115(c).
25. 8 T.C. 442 (1947).
26. 167 F2d 214, 218 (8th Cir. 1948).
27. U. S. TREAS. REG. 111, §29.112 (b)(6)-3(a).
28. 167 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1948).
29. Service Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1948).
30. P-H 1947 TC Mmsr. DEc. Saav. 1147,070 (1947).
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for tax purposes, regardless of the intent of the parties. 31 Thus, in the
only two Court of Appeals cases deciding this point, it has been held
that requisites for a three-year plan of liquidation may be far from
formal and that intent does not constitute a proper element in the
judicial determination of applicability.
An even more recent Tax Court case, International Investment
Corp.,32 follows the Burnside and Service Co. cases and indicates con-
sistency upon the part of the Tax Court, at least so far as dealing with
attempts by the taxpayer to avoid the consequences of 112 (b)(6) is
concerned. The taxpayer corporation's wholly owned subsidiary sold
all of its assets in one taxable year and liquidated shortly thereafter.
However, it extended liquidation distributions over into the following
year. In defeating the parent's attempt to recognize a tax loss upon the
cancellation of its stock in the subsidiary, the Tax Court held that the
distribution need not be completed within the taxable year in order to
comply with Section 112 (b)(6), even where the plan is not formal,
since the provision allows three years within which to liquidate.
A singular example of successful argument in the Tax Court by a
parent corporation that there had been no plan of liquidation appears
in Oregon Land & Livestock Co., 3 decided in 1943. There, however,
the fact situation, as reported by the court, was perhaps influential in
distinguishing the case from those later arising. The taxpayer parent
and X Corporation had transferred separately owned timber tracts to
Corporation S in order to execute a sale to a third party. In 1938, X
became dissatisfied with the purchaser's performance, and the con-
tracts were terminated. S returned to X its contributed land in ex-
change for X's stock in S. Later, in 1939, S was completely liquidated.
The Tax Court found no element of tax avoidance present. Although
the Commissioner urged a finding that the liquidation of S was part of
a unitary plan, the Tax Court held that the 1938 and 1939 distributions
were separable since there was no plan prior to 1939.24 Realistically
speaking, there appears little to distinguish the facts of this case from
those which brought different tax results in the Burnside, Serice Co.
and International Investment cases. The most apparent difference that
can be found is that in the Oregon Land case intent was given weight,
while in the other similar fact situations it was not considered impor-
tant. The distinction, then, was not one of fact, but of legal criterion.
Proof of intent to avoid taxation is difficult even in the simple case,
31. 165 F.2d 75, 77 (6th Cir. 1948).
32. 11 T.C. 678 (1948).
33. P-H 1943 TC fMEr. Dac. Sav. 1143,503 (1943).
34. The decision here had the end result of placing the parent Mthin the azmbit of
§ 112 (b) (6) and thus enabling it to postpone recognition of gain. If the transactions had
been held unitary in nature, the requisite 80% stock owmership would not have b-nen
present.
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and if tax liability under Section 112 (b)(6) is to be dependent on a
positive finding of intent to formulate a plan, an effective means of tax
avoidance will remain open to the taxpayer.
Except for the Oregon Livestock decision, which may be regarded as
aberrational, we have thus far dealt only with cases involving taxpayer
attempts to avoid the applicability of Section 112 (b)(6), and have
found such efforts generally unsuccessful.3" Caution must be exercised,
however, in extracting a general rule from these decisions. Where the
taxpayer attempts to apply Section 112 (b) (6) in order to postpone the
recognition of gain from liquidation, its formal compliance with the
statutory provisions may not prove so successful. For although the
courts have apparently laid equal emphasis upon the informality of
plan and upon the unimportance of intent to comply, it is probable
that the latter ground has been the more important in reaching the
final result.3" If this intent argument should some day become ac-
ceptable to the courts, the important "form through substance" doc-
trines established by the Supreme Court in the Higgins and Griffiths 11
cases would be rendered virtually meaningless. Thus it is likely that
the corporate taxpayer will face a strict interpretation of the relief
provisions where his intent is to come within their purview. Although
Section 112 (b)(6) was probably passed only as a means of granting
amnesty to corporate simplification,3" it has proved to be a double-
edged weapon capable of inflicting equally as much damage upon un-
wary taxpayers as relief to those who qualify.
DOES "PROPERTY" INCLUDE MONEY?
Until recently one of the more controversial issues arising under
Section 112 (b)(6) has been whether or not "property" as used in the
section should include money distributed in liquidation. The original
Senate amendment specified that no gain would be recognized on the
receipt of either money or property.39 However, the version which
finally became law stipulated that gain would be recognized on receipt
of money and exempted only other forms of property.
43
35. Cases cited note 21 supra.
36. Actually the "plan" requirement serves but a slightly useful function. Its chief
use appears the prevention of taxpayer gains from § 112 (b) (6) which would otherwise
result from hindsight. If it were not for the plan requirement, taxpayer corporations
could let their subsidiaries go into liquidation and decide at any time within the three
year period whether or not to take a tax-postponed liquidation. If it appears worthwhile
to go through a taxable liquidation, the parent may avoid § 112 (b) (6) by dexterous
juggling of its control or by a postponement of its liquidation over more than the three
year period.
37. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355
(1939).
38. Text at notes 7 and 8 supra.
39. BAuR & MoRRIs, HmDEN TAXES IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 326 (1935).
40. . . . No gain or loss shall be recognized upon the receipt by a corporation of
[Vol. 58010501056
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This wording was changed in the Revenue Act of 1936 by omitting
the qualifying words "other than money," and the section has con-
tinued in this form until the present,41 a fact which would indicate that
Congress intended money to fall within the meaning of the relief pro-
visions. Furthermore, when discussing Section 115 (h) of the Revenue
Bill of 1938,42 the Senate Finance Committee explicitly expressed the
belief that Section 112 (b) (6) and (7) contained language broad enough
to include money. 43
While no positive indication as to the purpose of these changes ap-
pears in committee reports, they were apparently designed chiefly to
promote administrative efficiency. Under the original plan the calcula-
tion of the parent's basis, the value of the assets, and the gain and loss
was extremely burdensome where even a small amount of cash re-
mained in the liquidating subsidiary. It is doubtful that revenues ob-
tained by this exclusion of cash were sufficient to make the exception
worthwhile. 44
Although it appears fairly clear from the circumstances that Con-
gress intended "property" to include money,45 for several years a con-
property (other than money) distributed in complete liquidation of another corpora-
tion..... Revenue Act of 1935, § 110, 49 STAT'. 1020 (1936).
41. Revenue Act of 1936, § 112 (b) (6), 49 STAT. 1679 (1936) ; Ir. Rnv. Comz § 112
(b) (6).
42. Revenue Act of 1938, § 115 (h), 52 STAT. 49S (1933). This particular prolision
dealt with the effect on earnings and profits of distributions of stock, and referred to
"property or money!'
43. See history of these discussions in Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F2d
970, 972 (6th Cir. 1945). Further. strength for this legislative construction appears in
the treatment of the gain and loss provisions of §§ 112 (c) (1) and 112 (e). Under the
1935 Act these sections -,ere amended to exclude gain from property other than money,
and to exclude all losses. Revenue Act of 1935, § 110 (b), (c), 49 STAT. 1021 (1936).
Then, in 1936, when the parenthetical words "other than money" disappeared from
§ 112 (b) (6), §§ 112 (c) (1) and 112 (e) returned to their original pre-1935 form and
omitted any reference to § 112 (b) (6). At the same time, a new subsection (15) vs
added to § 113 (a) of the Act. Revenue Act of 1936, §§ 112 (b) (6), 112 (c) (1), 112 (C),
113 (a) (15), 49 STAT. 1679, 1680, 1634 (1936) ; ITrr. Rnv. Corz § 113 (a) (15). This new
provision was to be the sole determinant of basis in distributions under § 112 (b) (6),
rather than the general basis provisions applicable to transactions covered by other
§ 112 (b) subsections, as had previously been the case. And § 113 (a) (15) contained no
mention of any property or money which might be susceptible to gain or loss treatment
upon receipt under § 112 (b) (6) : "(15) PRopeny RncuEn BY A ConromTro:: O:; Con-
PLETE LIQuIDATIoN oF ANOTHEmr-
"If the property was received by a corporation upon a distribution in complete liquida-
tion of another corporation within the meaning of section 112 (b) (6), then the basis
shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor."
44. Darrell, Corporate Liquidations and the Fcdcral Income Tax, S9 U.oPPA.L.Rrv.
907, 927 (1941).
45. Even the Bureau, in G.C.M. 19,435, 1 Cu,.i BrLT 176 (1938), had interpreted
property to include money, under the section. What is more indicative is the fact that
this G.C.AL dealt with a taxpayer attempt to qualify within the provision, rather than
1949] 1057
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trary interpretation was placed upon the word as a result of a 1941
decision of the Tax Court in Stimson Mill Company." The case in-
volved the receipt of money alone by a taxpayer parent corporation in
complete liquidation of its subsidiary. The taxpayer reported a loss on
the liquidation and the Commissioner assessed a deficiency, alleging
that Section 112 (b)(6) was applicable and that accordingly the loss
could not be used as an offset against other gains. In denying the valid-
ity of this contention the Tay. Court placed emphasis upon the possi-
bility that such an extension of Section 112 (b) (6) might open the way
to tax avoidance by allowing a corporation to organize a subsidiary,
transfer to it property in exchange for all the shares, have the subsidiary
sell its property at a profit, then liquidate the subsidiary under Sec-
tion 112 (b)(6). The court's reasoning in this regard is difficult to
defend. For upon the sale of property the subsidiary would realize a
taxable gain, and there would be no greater escape from taxation than
if the subsidiary were first dissolved and property later sold by the
parent, the parent's basis being that of the subsidiary under Sec-
tion 113 (a)(15).
The court disregarded the intent argument, except for a single
statement that "the no-gain-or-loss provision was intended to cover
situations in which the corporate taxpayer received property, and
not money. .... ,, 47 It attempted to bolster its position by refer-
ence to the fact that other sections of the Code refer to "property"
and "money," as separate classes.
48
It was not until 1945 that the point was raised again, this time in the
Tri-Lakes Steamship case. 49 Here the taxpayer parent had attempted
to come within the ambit of Section 112 (b)(6) in order to postpone
gain on a liquidation transfer of cash. 0 The Court of Appeals for the
an effort to escape it. The Bureau placed considerable emphasis upon the relevance of
Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935), which held that property in-
cluded money as used in § 203 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1924. It was after the
Bureau regarded the question as settled that a taxpayer parent in the Slitson case,
note 46 infra, raised the issue again in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Code.
46. 46 B.T.A. 141 (1942), aff'd on other grounds, 137 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1943). It
is particularly interesting that the Ninth Circuit chose to take this stand, in view of its
earlier decision in Halliburton v. Commissioner, note 45 supra.
47. 46 B.T.A. 141, 143 (1942).
48. Supplement B, IxT. REv. CoDE, §§ 111-21, which deal with the computation of
net income.
49. Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1945), reversing
2 T. C. 1270 (1943).
50. Most cases which arise today involve attempts by parent corporations to avoid
the recognition of gain upon liquidation of subsidiary corporations. This is true because
of the fact that, for reasons unknown even in Wall Street, stock bases have been ab-
normally depressed below asset values during recent years. Corporations which organized
subsidiaries during the Thirties will find a considerable difference between their ad-
justed stock basis and the fair market value of assets distributed in liquidation.
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Sixth Circuit was emphatic in its rejection of the Bureau's position,
holding that "property" as used in Section 112 (b)(6) is a generic term
which embraces money. The court's reasoning was three-pronged:
(1) It traced the provision's legislative history, and concluded reason-
ably that Congressional intent must have been to allow cash distribu-
tions to fall within its purview. (2) It reasoned that since Halliburton v.
Commissioner 11 had held that "property" included money as used in
Section 203 (b)(4) of the Revenue Act of 1924,12 relating to the tax-
free exchange of property for stock, it was unfair to apply inconsistent
meanings in different portions of the same section of the Code. (3) It
noted that, after passage of the relief provision, the Senate Finance
Committee had interpreted the term "property" generically in com-
mittee hearings. 3
Following this decision, the Tax Court finally overruled its Slimson
holding in International Investment Corp." Here, once again, the Com-
missioner and the taxpayer switched briefs, and the former was success-
ful in preventing the recognition of loss to the taxpayer from a dis-
tribution to it in cash worth less than the basis of its stock in the sub-
sidiary which had been liquidated.
Judge Murdock, dissenting, felt that to consider money as property
would open the door to tax avoidance where the cash exceeded the cost
of the stock-just as did the majority in the Stimson case. He in-
dicated that the members of Congress could have had no wish to
achieve that result, while it is conceivable they may have desired to
deny recognition of loss when the cash received is less than the stock
originally cost, since the corporation might already have deducted for
operating losses on a consolidated return." Again, however, this rea-
soning appears inconsistent. For just as the corporation may have
already deducted such losses, it may likewise have previously reported
gain to the subsidiary on a consolidated return.
Furthermore, a holding that money is not a form of property might
frequently result in "double" taxation, since under Section 113 (a) (15)
the transferee-parent in a Section 112 (b)(6) liquidation takes the
subsidiary's basisA8 For instance, if property worth $50,000 had been
transferred to the subsidiary in exchange for an equivalent amount of
stock, and sold by it for 575,000, the subsidiary would recognize a gain
of $25,000. If the provisions of Section 112 (b)(6) were not available
to the parent, there would be a similar taxable gain to the parent upon
liquidation: the difference between the basis of its stock in the sub-
51. 78 F2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935).
52. Revenue Act of 1924, § 203 (b) (4), 43 STAT. 256 (1925).
53. See notes 42 and 43 supra.
54. 11 T.C. 678 (1948).
55. Id. at 686.
56. See note 43 supra.
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sidiary and the amount of the cash distribution. Conversely, a cor-
poration under the Stimson rule might take double capital losses, where
the sale price of transferred assets is less than the basis of the parent's
stock.
Thus it would appear that the holdings of the Sixth Circuit in the
Tri-Lakes Steamship case and the Tax Court in International Invest.
ment Corp. represent a salutary treatment of the "money-is-property"
question. Not only is the inclusion of money as "property" correct
from the standpoint of statutory construction, but it also results in a
more uniform tax result where a substantial amount of money is in-
volved in the liquidation. And although for some years the Bureau
continued to challenge the interpretation, it is now acquiescing in this
view.57 Perhaps it feels that the near future will see the liquidation at a
loss of many wartime subsidiaries; but for the present its decision will
result in a substantial benefit to holding corporations desiring to sim-
plify elaborate and complex organizations."8
LIQUIDATION DISTRIBUTIONS: DEBT PAYMENTS OR
RETURN OF CAPITAL?
Other questions of considerable importance to taxpayers concern
the treatment of debts owed to parent corporations where such cor-
porations liquidate their subsidiaries under Section 112 (b) (6).69
In H. G. Hill Stores,60 an insolvent corporation, S, transferred all of
its assets, subject to outstanding liabilities, to its parent corporation,
P, in cancellation of its indebtedness to the parent. P was the holder
of 98% of the outstanding shares of S. P then claimed a bad debt
deduction for the difference between the amount realized and the
amount owed. Although the Commissioner contended that the transac-
tion should properly come within Section 112 (b)(6) as a liquidation
distribution and the loss deduction be disallowed, the Tax Court sus-
tained the deduction. The court indicated that the parent might at the
same time be both a creditor and a shareholder of the subsidiary, and
that Section 112 (b)(6) was not intended to cover such a transfer of
57. 2 CCH FED. TAx REP. f 733.05 (1949).
58. See note 50 mstpra.
59. For a survey of the cases in this field and a listing of the factors which deter-
mine whether the advance to the subsidiary constitutes a loan or contribution, see Levy
and Simonds, Shareholder Advances: Loans or Capital Contributions, 25 TAxrs 127
(1947).
There has been some difference of opinion among the courts as to the preference
status of a parent-creditor upon liquidation. Many courts have treated such advances
as capital contributions where both corporations are under common control and manage-
ment, and accordingly have subjugated the claims to those of outside creditors. E, v,,
Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934);
Comment, 37 MicH. L. REv. 440 (1939).
60. 44 B.T.A. 1182 (1941).
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assets in satisfaction of a debt owed.01 The court ruled that the debt
must first be satisfied, and that since nothing remained after such pay-
ments, there could be no qualification under Section 112 (b)(6).
A similar result was reached recently in N orthern Coal & Dock Co.02
The subsidiary-taxpayer became insolvent in 1944 and transferred
certain assets to its parent in payment for debts owed. Some of the
assets were credited at considerably less than book value, and the
subsidiary claimed a loss for the difference. Although the Commissioner
argued that this was a distribution in liquidation under Section 112
(b) (6), the Tax Court found the transaction to be, in effect, a sale at
less than cost, and it accordingly allowed the deduction.
While the result in the Hill and Northern Coal cases proved to be pro-
taxpayer, the rule established by the Tax Court may be double-edged
in at least one instance. In the unusual case where the parent succeeds
in the full collection of the face value of the bonds and the amount re-
ceived exceeds the price paid, the difference between the cost of acquisi-
tion and the face value is taxable gain, and not a return of capital under
Section 112 (b)(6). Houston N'atural Gas Corp.0 3 supports this view.
There the court analogized the position of the parent to that of a bond
issuer which acquires its own bonds at a discount, and thus reasoned
that all gain to the parent should be taxed as a capital gain. However,
the court in a dictum indicated that the excess of the distributed
assets' value over the face value of the indebtedness would constitute a
liquidating dividend within the meaning of Section 112 (b)(6)." But
even this concession has been questioned, and may not stand the test
of litigation.65
The Tax Court dealt with a related problem recently in the Burnside
case." As will be recalled, the case involved an attempt by corporation
P, the parent, to deduct as a long term capital loss the difference
between the cost of its shares and the amount of cash received in liqui-
61. Similar results were obtained in Iron Fireman Manufacturing Co., 5 T. C. 452
(1945) (operating losses other than those previously deducted on consolidated returns) ;
B. F. Sturtevant Co., 47 B.T.A. 464 (1942) (loss on open accounts); Glennore Distil-
leries Co., 47 B.T.A. 213 (1942) (debt due on open account).
Under the rule of the Dobson; case the Tax Court's finding on the question of
whether shareholder advances constitute loans or capital contributions is final for any
practical purpose. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); Cohen v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1945).
WNhere stockholder advances are held to be loans, bad debt deductions may be ta:ken
when worthlessness occurs under INT. RE,. CoDo § 23 (k).
62. 12 T. C. 42 (1949).
63. 9 T. C. 570 (1947). This case has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit by the taxpayer. P-H Crrxron FED. TAx Sr-iv. 6310 (Supp. Oct. 22, 1943).
64. 9 T. C. 570, 574 (1947).
65. See STAI.MEY AND KIcuLL , THE FnrzaAL I-.co=in TAx 166 (1943).
66. Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1943).
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dation of its subsidiary, S. The Tax Court found no intent to comply
with Section 112 (b) (6), yet it held that the actions of P had effectively
placed the transaction within the domain of the section. The court
stated, in part:
"This provision was never intended to permit a parent corpora-
tion which sustained a loss in connection with a series of distribu-
tions received in complete liquidation of a subsidiary, to fail to
comply with the regulations and set up such failure in order to
claim such a loss as a deduction." 1
Of course, the facts of the Burnside case differ considerably from
those in the Hill and Houston cases, since in the Burnside situation
there was a loss arising directlyfrom liquidation, while the latter cases
dealt with actual operating debts owed the parent prior to liquidation.
Whether these superficial differences ought to bring opposite tax re-
sults is open to question. For, if the Burnside parent had had the fore-
sight to organize its subsidiary with a large percentage of fixed debt
rathe than stock, it could have taken a deduction for loss resulting
from uncollectibility. It is doubtful if any social or economic end is
served by this sort of incentive toward unwieldy fixed debt capital
structures, 8 even where the corporation is closely held, as is of course
the case under Section 112 (b) (6).
SUBSIDIARY LIQUIDATION: A DANGEROUS SALES DEVICE
We have observed how, under the Tri-Lakes case, a sale of the sub-
sidiary's assets to a third party, followed by a distribution in liquida-
tion to the parent of cash, will automatically result in the application
of the relief provisions of Section 112 (b) (6). Where the subsidiary has
a loss against which it may offset the gain resulting from the sale, such
a procedure is worthwhile. And rather than being merely postponed,
the gain in this situation is completely tax-free, since cash has no basis.
However, if the parent has a loss from operations and the subsidiary
does not, then it would appear advantageous at first glance to transfer
the property to the parent in a Section 112 (b) (6) liquidation and have
the parent consummate the sale to the ultimate vendee. Unfortunately
for the taxpayer, as a result of the recent Fairfield decision 11 in the
Second Circuit, this maneuver may be difficult of execution, although the
meaning of the case is far from clear. In the Fairfield case corporation
S, a subsidiary of P, possessed a steamship which it desired to sell to T.
67. 8 T. C. 442, 449 (1947).
68. See BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 494-5 (1946); 1 D.Wixa, FINANCIAL POLICY
OF CORPOPATIONs 261-2 (4th ed. 1946); Masslick, Financing a NCw Corporate Enter-
prise, 5 ILL. L. REv. 70, 72 (1910).
69. Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 774 (1946).
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It transferred the ship to P in a Section 112 (b)(6) liquidation, and
immediately thereafter P sold the ship to T and offset the gain against
other losses it had entailed. Except for the operation of the steamship,
P carried on S's business following the liquidation.
The court, through Judge Learned Hand, refused to regard these
maneuvers as separate transactions and held that taxable gain accrued
to S as a result of the sale, payable by P, which the court considered
as trustee in dissolution.
Since the case dealt solely with the tax liability of the subsidiary
corporation, the court confused its holding when it discussed the ap-
plicability of Section 112 (b)(6). For, as -will be recalled, the relief
provisions of Section 112 (b)(6) extend only to the parent. It would
have been simple for the court to have relied solely upon the doctrine
of the Court Holding Co.70 case and reached the same result without its
confusing reference to Section 112 (b)(6). In that case a corporation
owned by A and B negotiated for the sale of its sole asset, an apartment
house, and, finding that adverse tax consequences would result from
such a sale arrangement, cancelled the transaction. Shortly thereafter
the corporation was liquidated and the two shareholders then sold the
asset to the same purchaser with whom the corporation had previously
negotiated. The Supreme Court treated the shareholders only as a
conduit through which the title to the asset passed, and imputed the
sale directly back to the corporation. Thus gain from the sale was taxed
to the corporation, and gain from the receipt of the proceeds of the sale
in liquidation was taxable to the shareholders. Clearly, the theory of
the tax against the subsidiary in the Fairfield case should have been
based upon this rationale rather than upon Section 112 (b) (6).
Aside from this misconception of the problem, however, the court in
the Fairfield case, in what must be considered dictum, did announce a
new criterion for determining whether Section 112 (b)(6) liquidations
followed by immediate sale will fall within the relief provisions. Ap-
parently the chief foundation of the decision was the fact that there
had been no complete continuation of the liquidated business by P.
Since the old business was carried on with the sole exception of the
steamship operation, it was easy to see why the court considered
the "continuation of business" test a good one here. Although this
rationale had never been used before in similar cases arising under the
liquidation provisions of the Code, the court appears to have felt that
the legislative history of Section 112 (b)(6) restricts its application
solely to cases involving simplification of corporate structures and not
to taxpayer attempts to consummate sales at a tax advantage.71 There
is much to commend this view, although it has been sharply attacked.72
70. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
71. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
72. Kurtz, A Critique of the Fairficld Stcamship Case, 25 TAxzs 612 (1947).
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Naturally there will arise hard cases under the rule imposed by the
court, but since the Tax Court is presumably an expert body trained in
getting the tax facts and since the Courts of Appeals are somewhat
limited in their powers to amend under the Dobson case, 73 the applica-
tion of the Fairfield rule should not prove impossible.
It is true that this "continuation of business" test might occasionally
result in unequal tax treatment. For example, if a parent were to dis.
solve first, rather than the subsidiary, shareholders would be taxed
on a capital gain only once. Since the shares in the subsidiary would
be taken as a distribution in kind and thus at their net asset value, 4
there would be no further gain when the subsidiary later liquidates.
Even here, however, it is probable that application of the "continua-
tion of business" test would render this sort of sale taxable both to the
subsidiary and the parent.
Disregarding the particular rule of the Fairfield case, other cases in-
volving liquidation followed by sale have turned chiefly on whether
or not in fact the sale negotiations were commenced or anticipated
prior to liquidation, under the Court Holding Co. rationale. Mr. Justice
Black, in that case, summarizes the Court's theory of decision:
"The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of
property are not finally to be determined solely by the means em-
ployed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be
viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of
negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale
by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale
by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass
title." Is
This "prior negotiations" test appears a weak one in some instances.
For example, many of the cases where the courts have refused to
impute gain to the corporation on sales by shareholders have involved
sales of liquor stocks 7 -a commodity with a stable and well-known
market value. In these transactions there was little necessity to en-
gage in sale negotiations of any sort prior to liquidation distribution.
Other equally marketable commodities could just as easily avoid the
application of the "prior negotiations" rule. It should be obvious from
the cases thus far decided that exclusive reliance upon this test could
result in large scale tax avoidance. The only leading case going against
the taxpayer on this point under Section 112 (b)(6) has been the Fair-
field decision-a dubious authority at best, involving a most difficult
73. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), see supra note 61.
74. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-20; Kurtz, supra note 74, at 613.
75. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331,334 (1945).
76. E.g., United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948);
J. T. S. Brown's Son Co., 10 T. C. 840 (1948); Acampo Winery & Distilleries, 7 T. C.
629 (1946) ; but cf. Steubenville Bridge Co., 11 T. C. 789 (1948).
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commodity to value and liquidate on short notice. 7 It is reasonable to
assume that under the present law most taxpayer corporations will
find tax avoidance of the variety there attempted more successful than
did the Fairfield company.
Thus far we have dealt with two types of sales to outside interests:
where assets of the subsidiary are sold, followed by liquidation, and
where the subsidiary is liquidated, followed by sale of the assets by the
shareholders. There remains a third: the parent may sell its stock in
the subsidiary to a buyer corporation, which might then liquidate the
subsidiary and take over the desired assets. 8 In this situation Sec-
tion 112 (b)(6) may be important in several ways: the buying corpora-
tion may desire that the liquidation be carried out under Section 115 (c)
where the assets to be acquired have market values not higher than the
amount paid for the stock, or where for other reasons, such as estab-
lishing bases for depreciation charges, the buyer wishes a stepped-up
asset basis.79 Similarly, if the purchaser contemplates resale, it is likely
to wish a taxable liquidation, since otherwise it would take over the
subsidiary's basis for the property, even though it paid considerably
more than this figure for the stock. This may mean that the parent
would suffer an over-all loss under the "relief" provisions of Section
112 (b) (6), if that section be held applicable.60 On the other hand, the
buyer corporation may upon occasion be anxious to carry through a
tax-postponed liquidation under Section 112 (b)(6) in order to take
over the asset basis of the subsidiary, where that basis is higher than
the amount paid for the stock, and where no other gains need be offset.8'
77. Supra, pp. 1062-3.
78. Cf. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T. C. 114 (1949), where after
an unsuccessful effort to purchase an office building owned by Development, its stoc:
was acquired by the would-be purchaser and the building acquired in that manner.
The purchaser, a bank, "continued the business" in the sense that it remained a tenant
of the building after the transaction. Cf. Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, note
69 supra.
79. Since in most cases the basis of stock in the hands of the purchasing corporation
will approximate the value of assets received in liquidation, the purchaser will realize little
taxable gain under a § 115 (c) liquidation. Furthermore the new parent vill possess the
distinct advantage of having stepped up the basis of the assets in its hands to the fair
market value at the time of distribution. (Assuming that the basis of assets to the
subsidiary was below the present market value.)
80. Thus, if the assets had a basis in the hands of the subsidiary of $100,000, but
an actual present value of $150,000, and the vendee purchased the subsidiary's stol: for
$150,000, the vendee upon liquidation, would take the assets at a basis of $100,000 under
§ 112 (b) (6). This means that on resale a taxable gain of $50,000 would be realized.
81. Let us assume assets in the subsidiary's hands have a basis of $1,000,000, and the
vendee pays $800,000 for the stock ownership. If the vendee anticipates no other gains
in the taxable year, it will be to its advantage to obtain the $1,000,000 basis by means
of a § 112 (b) (6) liquidation. By so doing it can establish higher charges for depredation
and resell the assets for $1,000,000 without recognizing taxable gain.
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In the latter instance the purchaser would face two serious obstacles,
First, under the "continuation of business" rule promulgated in the
Fairfield case, it must show an intent to retain and use the distributed
asset.82 Even assuming such an intent can be established, a greater
stumbling block looms in Section 129 of the Code.83 This section pro-
vides that where a corporation or an individual acquires control of
another corporation for purposes of taking deductions, credits, etc.,
which it could not otherwise obtain, such deductions and credits will
be disallowed. 84 The provisions of Section 129 apply only in cases
where the transferee corporation determines the basis of acquired
property by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor. Since
the announced purpose of Section 129 was to prevent taxpayers from
perverting Sections 112, 113 and 141 of the Code,8" it would appear
applicable to the situation in question. Of course, the corporation can
qualify under Section 112 (b)(6), providing the Government fails to
sustain its tax avoidance allegation, which may occur where all formali-
ties have been scrupulously complied with by the purchaser.
In the case where the purchaser desires to take over the subsidiary's
basis for the acquired assets, its problem is not so difficult, although
here again the Bureau will probably scrutinize carefully all suspicious
purchases and liquidation arrangements. It would seem doubtful that
the purchasing corporation could avoid the reach of Section 112 (b) (6)
merely by technical failure to meet the provision's requirements. Yet
in Commissioner v. Day & Zimmerman,7 a glimpse, at least, of a loop-
hole has appeared. In that case the parent sold a portion of its stock
in its two subsidiaries to the parent's treasurer, and thus fell below the
80% minimum stock ownership requirement of Section 112 (b)(6).80
The following year it liquidated both subsidiaries at a loss and applied
this loss against other gains. The Third Circuit held, surprisingly, that
the sale was bona fide, even though to a corporation officer, and that
Section 112 (b)(6) was not applicable. This case may do much to en-
82. See note 78 mupra.
83. INT. REV. CODE § 129; see Chase, An Analysis of Seclion 129 of the Itcrn1al
Revenue Code, 30 CORN. L. Q. 421 (1945).
84. Section 129 (b) empowers the Commissioner to allow whatever portion of claimed
deductions or credits he feels is justified in the individual case, and to allocate disallowed
deductions, etc., between corporations and individuals concerned. IxT. REv. COD § 129
(b) (1), (2).
85. H. R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943).
86. Even where the liquidating transaction was in the form of a sale of subsidiary's
assets to the parent, and where there was no formal dissolution, § 112 (b) (6) has been
held to apply. Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., P-H 1945 TC Mlm. DEC. Sav. 145,248 (1945).
87. 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945).
88. Section 112 (b) (6) (A) specifies that the parent must hold at least 80 of the
total voting power of all voting classes of stock and 80% of other classes of stock, from
the date of the plan's adoption until distribution takes place, and that the parent may
not sell any stock between the date of adoption and the date of distribution.
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courage similar transactions. But lawyers would be well advised to
use caution in recommending such arrangements. Thus far Day &
Zinmnernzan stands alone against such formidable opposition as Court
Holding Co. and Fairfield, and unless the Supreme Court is to veer
sharply off its present course, such attempts at tax avoidance will con-
tinue to be fraught with danger to the corporations involved.
CONCLUSION
It is evident from this study of problems arising under Section 112
(b) (6) that the original statutory provision left much to judicial guess-
work. On the whole, this sort of vague treatment appears warranted in
principle. Experience has proved, particularly with reference to the
Internal Revenue Code, that attempts to particularize included and
excluded categories of taxability have frequently resulted in socially
undesirable tax avoidance. 9 And while the general provisions of Sec-
tion 112 (b)(6) have caused considerable uncertainty among corporate
tax counsel, it has not been demonstrated that certainty should be
the primary goal of our tax policy-unless it be the certainty that no
taxpayer can successfully comply with the letter yet violate the spirit
of the Code." Only ad hoc decisions of the courts, in the final analysis,
can guarantee that the policy behind the enactment of Section 112
(b) (6) of the Code will prevail in every parent-subsidiary liquidation
arrangement.
Contrariwise, decisions such as that of Judge Hand, in the Fairfield
case, indicate that the lay courts still have far to go in adequately
familiarizing themselves with the technique of dealing with compli-
cated federal tax problems. Until such familiarity is attained, a more
consistent result might be achieved by a considerably greater degree
of particularity in the Regulations, where particularity need not bring
with it tax avoidance. By such means the courts would at least be
guided toward a more expert analysis of the complex tax problems
which they will inevitably face under our system of administrative
appeals.
89. See Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 3S CoL L. Rnv. SO (1933).
90. "We do not deem it advisable to lay down any hard and fast rule... Were
we to do so, a certain class of gentlemen ... would lie av.-a-e nights endeavoring to
conceive some devious and shadowry way of evading the law. It is more advisable to deal
with each case as it arises." State v. Whitaker, 118 Ore. 656, 247 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1926).
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